A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanction

Because Magistrate Judge Chen denied Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions on the grounds that it was untimely, a chronology of the events leading to the motion is instructive.

First, Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants’ statements in its motions to dismiss justify sanctions by the Court. Plaintiff claimed that Defendants mischaracterized its fraud claim and improperly argued that it lacked the right to sue. Defendants filed motions to dismiss on June 15, 2006, based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim and the Court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Plaintiff filed oppositions to those motions on July 26, 2006, and Defendants filed reply briefs on August 1, 2006. In an August 23, 2006 order, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motions. Plaintiff served its Rule 11 motion on Defendants on March 14, 2007, over six months later.

Second, Plaintiff also moves under Rule 11 to sanction claims that Defendants made in their

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opposition to Plaintiff’s October 10, 2006 motion to strike. In that opposition, according to Plaintiff’s motion, Defendants made a frivolous argument regarding Plaintiff’s copyright registration, mischaracterized Plaintiff’s licensing and pricing procedures, and offered a meritless affirmative defense of unclean hands. On November 17, 2006, the Court ruled on the motion to strike, issuing an order that granted in part and denied in part the motion. Plaintiff served its Rule 11 motion on Defendants on March 14, 2007, nearly four months later.

Third, Plaintiff also raises grounds for sanctions arising out of Defendants’ September 29, 2006 joint case management statement, alleging that Defendants falsely accused Plaintiff of failing to produce necessary documents at a conference. In addition, Plaintiff argues that in their December 6, 2006 seconded amended answer, Defendants repeated their misstatement of Plaintiff’s pricing of its products. The March 14, 2007 service of the Rule 11 motion on Defendants came over five months after the joint case management statement and over three months after the seconded amended answer.

Magistrate Judge Chen concluded that Plaintiff’s Rule 11 motion was untimely based on Advisory Committee Notes that accompany the rule. He applied the standard that “[o]rdinarily [the] motion should be served promptly after the inappropriate paper is filed, and, if delayed too long, may be viewed as untimely.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) and (c), 1993 Advisory Committee Notes. The magistrate judge’s order properly applied appropriate law. He reasonably concluded that the motion was untimely because “it was not filed until may months after Defendants’ offending contentions were made and long after the presiding judge had already considered or ruled upon the papers containing the offending contentions.” (Ord. Denying Pl.’s Mot. for Sanctions and Grant. Defs’ Mot for Atty.’s Fees, p. 2.) The Plaintiff admits in its objection that a determination of timeliness is discretionary; the magistrate judge acted within this discretion.

Plaintiff points out that the magistrate judge erroneously found that the Rule 11 motion did not involve pleadings, since Plaintiff did request that the Court impose sanctions on Defendants for claimed mischaracterizations in their second amended answer. However, this argument does not undermine the conclusion that the motion is untimely. “Plaintiff pointed out that . . . sanctions for violations in pleadings are determined at the end of case.” (Pl.’s Obj. to Mag. Judge’s Ruling, p. 5.)

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Therefore, Rule 11 motion for sanctions arising from Defendants’ pleading was untimely because Plaintiff filed it too early by not awaiting the end of the case. Because Magistrate Judge Chen’s order denying Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is not in clear error nor is it contrary to law, the Court declines to set aside his order.²

B. Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

A court has discretion to award attorney’s fees to the party that prevails on the motion. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). Plaintiff relies on a Supreme Court case that interpreted the attorney fee shifting provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act and of the Americans with Disabilities Act to define “prevailing party.” See Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 605 (2001). This case does not inform an analysis of Rule 11. The magistrate judge provided authority for imposition of attorney’s fees on the party that successfully defends against a Rule 11 motion. See EEPC v. Tandem Computers, 159 F.R.D. 224

(D. Mass. 1994). Since Defendant was the prevailing party on the Rule 11 motion, the magistrate judge had discretion to award it attorney’s fees. The award was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.

CONCLUSION The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s objection to the magistrate judge’s June 11, 2007 order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions.